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NOTES AND COMMENTS
POWER OF A STATUTORY RECEIVER TO BORROW
MONEY FROM THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE
CORPORATION AND TO PLEDGE ASSETS
IN HIS POSSESSION
Has a statutory receiver of a state bank the power, upon receving the sanction of the court, to borrow money from and
pledge assets in his possession to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and to use the money borrowed to pay preferred creditors and a dividend to depositors 9
This question was answered in the negative by the Supreme
Court of Utah in a recent case of Riches v. Hadlock,' the court
stating that a bank commissioner "is a mere executive creature
of the statute, not of the court, and can exercise only such powers
as the statute has given him, and no order of the court applied
for can be broader than the statute." The statute' authorized the
commissioner, upon talung possession of a state bank, "to collect
money due such bank and to do such other acts as are necessary
to preserve its assets and business and shall proceed to liquidate
the affairs thereof." The court held that the general words "to
preserve assets," even by applying the maxim "ejusdem generis,"
could not be given a meamng to borrow money and pledge assets
to pay dividends without doing violence to language and concluded that the bank commission could not borrow the money
The same result was reached by the Supreme Court of Wyoming
in State ex rdt. Rzchmond s in which the identical question was
before the court under an identical statute.' The court, after admitting that the bank examiner may borrow money in the exercise
of his function to "do such other acts as are necessary to preserve the assets in his custody as in the case where taxes must be
paid, liens discharged on property or repairs made to prevent
injury or destruction of property, concluded that the proposed
conduct of the examiner was in no respect analogous and that he
had not the authority contended for.
Washington, North Carolina and Iowa have answered the question in the affirmative. In the case of In re LTquidatwn of Cashmere State Bank,5 under a statute6 similar to the statutes of Wyoming and Utah, the Washington court conceded that "neither
statute nor judicial decision expressly confer authority upon the
state supervisor of banking to borrow money and pledge the
assets of the insolvent bank in his custody to pay dividends. It
must also be conceded that equity receivers do not by virtue of
their mere appointment possess such powers." The court held
that the supervisor was an executive officer of the state, whose
duties were of a public nature and in discharging them he acts
for the public interest and stated. "We are induced to place such
Pac. (2nd) 283 (Utah) (1932).
' Utah (laws of 1921, c 23 subsec. 7, as amended by the laws of 1923,
115

c33).

'14 Pac. (2nd) 673 (Wyo.) (1932).
,Wyo. Revised Statutes, Sec. 10512.
r13 Pac. (2nd) 892, 169 Wash. 258 (1932).
6 Rem. Comp. Statutes, Sec. 3269.
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construction upon the statute as will enable him to admimster
speedily, adequately and comprehensively the trust imposed upon
him," and the court concluded that the statute gave the supervisor the authority to apply to the court for permission to borrow
the money of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and pledge
the assets of the defunct bank. However, the court had another
ground upon which to base its decision, namely, that the Washmgton Constitution7 vested in the superior courts of the state,
equity jurisdiction, and this could not be taken from them by
statute.
In Blades v. Hood8 the North Carolina Court, in considering
this question under a similar statute, 9 held that it was not the
intention of the legislature to take from courts of equity their
inherent power to permit the commissioner of banks to exercise
the functions of a chancery receiver in matters not inconsistent
with his statutory duties, and concluded that this was a case calling for the exercise of such equitable jurisdiction.
The Iowa court was confronted with the same question in the
case of Andrew v. First Trust & Savngs Bank of Sioux City, et
al."0 The Iowa statute" provided for the taking of possession of
insolvent banks by the superintendent of banks and that he might
apply to the proper court for the appointment of himself as receiver, and then provides that "its affairs shall thereafter be under
the direction of the court." The court said, "The receiver we
have to deal with * * * is a statutory receiver, * * * and his rights
and the power of the court over him are derived from statute,"
and concluded that "its affairs" included the proposed loan and
that the court had the power to pass upon and grant or deny the
same.
The distinction in these cases would at first glance seem to be
merely one of statutory construction. The Utah court was of the
opinion that the language of their statute was plain and its meaning so clear that there was no room for construction and necessitated the application of the familiar maxim, "a thing expressed
puts an end to construction." However, the Washington court
did not think the legislature intended to limit the duties of the
office to those mentioned, but should also include those incidental
and collateral duties which naturally and properly promote the
performance of the principal duties, as constitutions and statutes
seldom define with precision the scope of any office. The Wyoming court states, "that the district court has no legal authority to
deal with the affairs of an insolvent bank in the hands of the
state examiner unless the statute so directs," and continues, "Our
attention has been drawn to no statutory provision, either in
terms or by necessary implication, directing the district courts
to act upon such an application * * * " The court was of the
opinion that the legislature, in specifically enumerating the duties
Washington State Const. Art. 14, Sec. 6.
S.E. 828, 203 N. C. 56 (1932).
9North Carolina Code of 1931, Sec. 218 (c) subsec. 7.
8164

L0244 N. W 394 (Iowa)

(1932)

"Iowa Code of 1931, Sec. 9238, 9239 and 9242.
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of the examiner, had, by implication, excluded all those not mentioned.
The Iowa court, after stating that the receiver with whom they
were dealing was a statutory one and his powers and the court's
power over him were derived from the statute said. "One of the
'affairs' involved in this receivership is the question of the proposed loan under consideration." It will be noted that the Iowa
court probably went farther than any of the other cases had to
go or would have had to go, to find an authority given by the
statute to borrow the money from the R. F C. Thus it seems
that the statutes and their construction do not constitute a sound
ground for the distinction in these cases. It would seem that the
basis of the decisions may be placed upon the public policy of the
several states.
The Wyoming court was the only one which had before it the
contract which the bank examiner intended to submit to R. F 0.
for its acceptance. The court, looking at the contract and the
R. F C. Act,1 2 pointed out that its effect would be to take the
assets of the defunct bank from the bank examiner and place the
control of them in the hands of the R. F C. and by the contract
the bank examiner bound himself to the use of diligence in the
collection of the pledged securities, whether or not he used the
diligence required would be decided by the R. F C. Then, too,
as stated by the examiner in Ins evidence, the loan was sought upon
the theory that in the next few years conditions would improve
and the securities and assets could be liquidated at a much better
advantage to depositors and creditors than was possible at the
present time. The court was of the opimon that this was nothing
more than a gamble on future conditions and concluded that if
the bank examiner thought it advisable to postpone the liquidation of the assets there was nothing in the statutes to prohibit him
22U. S. Code Title 15, Sec. 605. Loans and advances by corporations;
allocation; security- form; limitation on amount; period of loan; fees
and commissions. To aid in financing agriculture, commerce, and industry,
including facilitating the exportation of agricultural and other products,
the corporation is authorized and empowered to make loans, upon such
terms and conditions not inconsistent with this chapter as it may determine, to any bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, Federal
land bank, jomt stock land bank, Federal intermediate credit bank, agricultural credit corporation, live stock credit corporation, organized under
the laws of any State or of the United States, including loans secured
by the assets of any bank that is closed, or in the process of liquidation
to aid in the reorganization of liquidation of such banks, upon tlhe
application of the receiver or liquidating agent of such bank and any
receiver of any national bank is hereby authorized to contract for such
loans and to pledge any assets of the bank for securing the same:
Provided, That not more than $200,000,000 shall be used for the relief of
banks that are closed or in the process of liquidation.
All loans made under the foregoing provisions shall be fully and adequately secured. The corporation, under such conditions as it shall prescribe, may take over or provide for the administration and liquidation
of any collateral accepted by it as security for such loans. * * ** * *
Each such loan may be made for a period not exceeding three years,
and the corporation may from time to time extend the time of payment of
any such loan, through renewal, substitution of new obligations, or otherwise, but the time for such payment shall not be extended beyond five
years from the date upon which such loan was made originally, * * * * *
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from withholding the liquidation until such time as he thought
advisable for the best interests of the depositors.
The Washington court considers the effect the closing of the
bank had upon the community which it served, pointing out how
the farmers and orchardists of the Cashmere valley were left without means of credit enabling them to buy seeds, plant crops and
prune their fruit trees, and indicated the effect this loan, if authorized, will have in relieving the community of its financial
stress. Considering that the bank examiner is an executive officer
of the state with quasi public duties to be adminstered in such a
manner as to promote the welfare of the public, the court concludes
that the statute is sufficiently broad to include the power of the
examiner to borrow money and pledge the assets.
Whether or not the public policy of the state should be declared
in favor of the authority of the bank examiner to borrow the money
of the R. F C. and pledge the assets of the insolvent bank, must
involve the consideration of two questions, namely-first, will
such a loan "preserve its assets" and second, will the loan benefit
the depositors and creditors? These questions are so closely related that they will be considered together.
It is contended in these cases that such a loan will preserve the
assets of the insolvent bank. But the loan in no way protects the
assets from loss or destruction, nor does it keep them intact or
existent. In fact the loan may waste the assets to the extent of the
interest charge on the loan, or cause them to be wasted in the protection of them by the bank examiner while they are pledged to
the R. F C.
Another argument in favor of the loan is that it benefits the
depositors and creditors by making available to them the proceeds
of the loan which will give them some ready money and also form
the basis for credit, and delay the sale of the assets until a time
when the market will be more favorable. However, it would seem
that the possibility of injury is just as great as is the possibility
of benefit, since the period for which the borrowing is made may
produce no favorable result. In granting the loan the R. F C.
will undoubtedly take those assets considered most valuable as
security for their loan, thus leaving with the receiver the less valuable assets, and these it is his duty to liquidate. This does not
seem desirable from a business viewpoint, for having only the
poorer assets of the bank they will be difficult to dispose of to the
best advantages of the depositors and creditors. Who is to say
that the depositors and creditors would rather gamble on future
condition than to have the present value of the assets I The present
value being at least as much as the proposed loan for which they
are to be pledged, thus as much will be done to relieve the financial
stress of the community as would be done under the proposed loan,
and this is the only reason given for the granting the authority of
the bank examiner to borrow the money of the R. F C.
BYRON E.
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